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Abstract 
A background in 'ordinary' crime, violence and drug use seems to characterize many European 
individuals recently involved in ISIS related jihadi-violence. With its long tradition of studying 
marginalized populations and street culture, criminology offers novel ways to theoretically explore 
these developments. In this paper, we demonstrate how Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of capital, 
habitus, and field allow for a nuanced analysis of how certain individuals move from street to 
politico-religious criminality. We show that 'investments' in street capital can be expended within 
the field of violent jihadism. We argue that an embodied street habitus supports continuities in 
attitudes and behaviours within different violent contexts, and furthermore that street social capital 
facilitates recruitment to violent jihadism. Finally, reflection is offered on resonances between street 
and jihadi fields. The paper explains how continuities in lifestyle can exist between the European city 
and Middle Eastern battleground. 
 
 
Introduction 
In the small Norwegian town of Fredrikstad, three friends: Sammiulla Khan, Abo Edelbijev og Torleif 
Angel Sanchez Hammer (all born in 1991) travelled to Syria in 2013 and 2014. They had not shown 
any sign of religious commitment until a year before travelling. Rather they would hang out together 
to smoke hashish and play videogames. Meanwhile in the UK, Mohammed Emwazi (born 1988) was 
reported missing by his London-based family in August 2013 only to be identified again a year later 
in the much-circulated grisly murder video of US journalist James Foley. Dubbed by the media as 
‘Jihadi John’, he featured in a number of similar videos, although his contested biography suggested 
an individual whose affinity at one time seemed to lie more with petty crime and street culture than 
militant violence. Far from alone in his terrorist endeavours, Emwazi was one of a number of young, 
marginalised British men from similar parts of London to fight and kill for ISIS.  
These two cases are indicative of a more general trend in what Sageman (2006) describes as the 
‘third wave of jihadi terrorism’: predominantly marginalized individuals, usually born and raised in 
Europe (as opposed to the expatriate intellectuals studying in the west that characterized the first 
two). There is evidence that street culture and the prison have become notable arenas for the 
recruitment of terrorists (Basra and Neumann, 2016). More heterogeneous, complex, fluid, partial 
and networked than pervious forms of radicalization, recruitment and organization, contemporary 
jihadism also relies heavily on the internet and social media (Brauchler 2004, Thompson 2011). 
Marginalized individuals always have been part of European jihadist networks (Nesser 2015), but it 
seems that the involvement of street criminals has been more pronounced in ISIS. The profiles of 
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terrorist attackers increasingly feature previous criminal records and more ‘western’ backgrounds, 
targets and cultural preferences (Sageman 2008; Hegghammer 2009; Rabasa and Benard 2014). 
Empirical research specifically exploring the links between street crime and contemporary terrorism 
is now emerging (see e.g. Lakhani 2018), providing impetus for the development of theoretical 
explanations to understand them. Drawing on the emerging perspective of Bourdieusian 
criminology, this paper provides one. 
While the links between crime, street culture, and contemporary violent jihadism have been 
described in previous research (see Basra and Neumann 2016), few attempts have been made to 
explain them in relation to social theory. Drawing on case studies of the Norwegian and British 
individuals cited at the beginning of this paper, we examine how those who initially exhibit 
adherence to a hedonistic and materialist culture end up committing acts of violence ostensibly in 
the service of an ascetic and politico-religious ideology. We explain why such individuals retain forms 
of street practice and lingo even as they undertake violent jihad. Positioning these two cases as 
illustrative of wider trends in contemporary terrorism, we show how the concepts of street capital, 
street habitus, and street social capital in different ways explain the transition. 
The aim is thus to develop a theoretical framework that accounts for both the role of politico-
religious cultures and varying kinds of marginalization involved in the process of becoming jihadi. In 
these efforts, we share a spirit with those scholarly works that depart from simplistic model of 
cognitive radicalisation and emphasize the existential emotions (Cottee and Hayward 2011) 
embodied transformations (Crone 2014) and fractured lives (Walklate and Mythen 2016) of 
contemporary western jihadists. However, rather than according a master status to issues of 
marginalization, ideology or aggression, the Bourdieuian account offered here provides a dynamic 
understanding that captures the fluidity of identity and ideological commitment, the durability of 
existing modes of being and the resonances between street and jihadi fields. The paper in this way 
makes a novel contribution to the terrorism literature, whilst expanding the scope for the 
application of Bourdieuian criminology.  
 
From the street to jihad 
The crime-terror nexus describes the linkages between organised criminal groups and terrorists. 
Traditionally, it refers to terrorists using crime as a source of funding, and the partnership of    
organized criminal organizations and terrorist groups (Wang 2010). Basra, Neumann and Brunner 
(2016) describe a new development where the criminal and jihadi worlds increasingly merge, so that 
both kinds of group ‘have come to recruit from the same pool of people, creating (often unintended) 
synergies and overlaps that have consequences for how individuals radicalise and operate’ (Basra, 
Neumann and Brunner 2016: 3). This does not mean that such tendencies are entirely novel (see  
Kjøk and Lia 2001) nor that the radicalisation of street criminals and gangs is widespread (Decker and 
Pyrooz 2011). Sageman’s (2007) characterization of third wave jihadi terrorism tends to refer more 
to notions of marginalization, culture and cool than street criminality. There is not the evidence to 
suggest that a great number of ‘ordinary’ street criminals are at risk of radicalization, rather a 
growing awareness that individuals who have become jihadists were once street criminals. 
 
Bakker (2011: 8, see also 2006) reports that a fifth of the jihadi terrorists in Europe had previously 
been convicted before their arrest for terrorist offences, and numbers seem to have increased over 
the last five to six years. The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST 2016) studied a sample of 137 
individuals suspected of being potential violent jihadists, from those frequenting extreme Islamist 
environments to others planning terror attacks or travelling to Syria to join ISIS. The relatively small 
group of women were generally law-abiding, but 68% of the men had been suspected, charged or 
sentenced for criminal acts prior to radicalization. Moreover, 43% were reported drug abusers, 42% 
had been involved in drug related crime and 46 % were charged with non-political violent offences. 
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There are similar numbers in Sweden where two out of three jihadi foreign fighters are reported to 
have been previously suspected for at least one crime (Rostami et al. 2018). 
 
Although high these numbers are based on registered crime, so it can be assumed that they are 
under-estimates. There has been evidence to suggest that those second-generation immigrants who 
feel marginalised within their western countries of residence seek alternative fields of life in which 
to thrive (Cottee, 2011). This is reflected in Nesser’s (2015) ‘misfits’ typology of jihadist terrorists in 
Europe. These he argues, display violent tendencies from early adolescence, often have a criminal 
and troubled background and do not perform well socially. 
 
Hagedorn (2008) in his work on global ‘gangsta culture’ notes that what are referred to as ‘terrorist 
groups’ share many characteristics with criminal street gangs and paramilitary militias. He argues 
that the more general phenomenon of ‘armed young men’ engaging in destabilising forms of 
violence are a ubiquitous symptom of globalised, late-modern society and economics. The styles, 
tropes and attitudes associated with ‘ordinary’ street culture and criminality find expression in 
political conflicts and violence (Ilan, 2015). In relation to previous generations, hybrid militant and 
street subcultures were noted – with ‘radical rudeboys’ fusing the aesthetics of street culture with 
Islamist tendencies (Vidino 2010; Quarishi 2013). Political messages from an Islamist perspective 
have featured in the incongruous genre of rap music (see e.g. Lombard 2007), more usually 
recognised for representing the concerns and aspirations of marginalised western populations.  
 
According to Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016: 26), violent jihadism plays two different roles for 
street criminals. It can be a way to justify criminal activity, arguing that stealing or killing enemies in 
dar al-harb (the lands of war) is a form of jihad. Jihadism can also be something of a ‘redemption 
narrative’ for marginalised street criminals (Basra and Neumann, 2016: 28-9), sometimes part of 
genuine processes of religious conversion. This is said to be one of the factors that render prisons 
into fertile recruiting spaces. This stands in contrast to the notion of religious conversion as a 
conventionally redemptive force for change in the life of the criminal. Indeed, in Messerschmidt’s 
(1997) analysis of the biography of Malcolm X, conversion to the Nation of Islam (which was 
followed later by conversion to ‘conventional’ Islam) was posited as a means by which the famous 
black activist could enact a respectable form of masculinity and transition from a life of hustling to 
one of righteousness. Such matters highlight the importance of disentangling conventional religiosity 
from practices of violent extremism.  
 
Bourdieusian Criminology 
We argue that Bourdieusian Criminology can help make sense of how petty-street criminals from a 
conventional or convert Muslim background make the transition to violent jihadism. Emerging from 
a number of different studies, this developing perspective applies Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977; 1984; 
1990) ‘thinking tools’ of field, habitus and capital to understand how individuals respond to social 
structure in becoming criminal agents. Sandberg and Pedersen’s (2011 see also Sandberg 2008a, 
2008b) work began this contemporary movement in earnest, conceptualising street culture as a 
‘field’ of social life and competition within which the marginalised strive for success, advantage and 
status through deploying the ‘street capital’ at their disposal. Bourdieusian criminology is finding 
applications in describing various kinds of street-criminal behaviour from ritualised violence (Fraser 
2015) to drug selling in different countries and contexts (Grundetjern and Sandberg 2012; Fleetwood 
2014; Moyle and Coomber 2016). It is also contributing to theoretical debates around the 
relationship between structural and individual factors in criminal aetiology (see Prieur 2018).  
In Bourdieusian terms, the street field is conceptualised as a heterodox arena of social life – where 
conceptions of worth, value and legitimacy are different to those operating within mainstream 
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fields. What advantages an individual in the street field will often devalue their position within 
orthodox fields of socio-economic life (Sandberg, 2008b: 157). Valuing inter-personal violence and a 
rugged demeanour bestows advantages in the world of street drug dealing but are arguably counter-
productive in the legitimate employment market. Importantly, fields are delineated by the operation 
of state law-enforcement mechanisms and the everyday operation of the society/economy whereby 
particular demographic groups can be more excluded (through criminalisation and marginalisation) 
or included (see Shammas and Sandberg 2016).  
The operation of social fields bisects with individual habitus – the accumulation of past experiences 
that orientates a person towards future events, a durable set of habits and acquired dispositions 
that shapes interpretations, actions and reactions. Habitus is created in an interplay between 
strategic agency and structures, but reproduced ‘without any deliberate pursuit of coherence’, or 
‘without any conscious concentration’ (Bourdieu 1984: 170). Fraser (2013; 2015) set out how a 
‘street habitus’ can emerge from experiences of poverty and marginalisation within specific 
contexts, in his research, young men on the socio-economic periphery of post-industrial Glasgow 
who participate in ritualised ‘gang’ violence during their teenage years. He notes that some of the 
same concerns around exhibiting a rugged, defiant masculinity can be observed amongst street 
cultures in other parts of the world, a phenomenon he discusses in terms of ‘homologies of habitus’ 
(Fraser, 2015).  
Indeed, as imagery and ideas float between marginalised populations globally, there is greater 
impetus for street cultures to increasingly borrow from each other and increasingly appear similar 
(Ilan, 2015). People committed to street culture also engage in other social fields, for example 
through schooling and family life (Kalkan 2018).There would still be reason to expect that a strong 
street habitus, with a developed capacity for interpersonal violence, will be transferable between 
heterodox fields.  
A key operational aspect of the habitus is the ways in which it orientates individuals to view their 
own characteristics and what they encounter around them as variously advantageous and 
disadvantageous. What Sandberg and Pedersen identified as ‘street capital’ (2011) are precisely 
those traits and resources that allow an individual to thrive within the street field: a capacity to 
engage in interpersonal violence, the ability to look ‘right’ (to have the mannerisms and style that 
communicate appropriate toughness), to deploy mental agility (or ‘smarts’) appropriately to get the 
best out of trades and interactions and to narrate their experiences and aspirations in the 
appropriate manner (see Sandberg and Fleetwood, 2016).  
In addition, Ilan (2013) notes the importance of ‘street social capital’: the advantages that are 
available through networks of street cultural contacts. In his study, he demonstrated how the 
cultivation and expenditure of street social capital allowed individuals to form protective alliances 
with other groups of tough, young men and to find criminal markets in other parts of the city. Street 
capitals can be acquired and expended where the habitus orientates an individual to feel this is the 
appropriate course of action. The process of growing older and changing life-stages can prompt 
individuals to invest in different forms of capital acquisition and expenditure (Barry, 2006), 
explaining how some individuals ‘age out’ of crime as they gain opportunities to cultivate and 
expend different capitals in the mainstream fields of employment and independent domestic life. 
Whether overt and observable, or internal and identity-related, events and changes in circumstances 
demonstrably have the power to reorder how individuals accumulate and expend capitals.  
A Bourdiusian framework can prove helpful for research on political and religious radicalization 
because it merges economic and cultural explanations (Bourdieu 1990). It can thus provide a more 
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nuanced, multi-faceted and dynamic understanding than those exclusively focused on ideology, 
geopolitics or aggression. Cultural ideas such as violent jihad – or street culture (Sandberg 2008a) 
will always relate and be embedded in a concrete material context, but this socio-economic 
foundation does not entirely determine their nature. The ideas may be more, less or in no way 
oppositional to more mainstream western ways of being. Marginalized and radicalised 
networks/individuals act with agency but at the same time are restricted by dominant structures in 
contemporary social fields of power (see Bourdieu, 1990). In part the existence of capitals allows for 
this agency in both street and jihadi fields. These capitals are forms of power only within heterodox 
fields and are relational and situational, but fundamentally embodied and based on early 
socialization and common experiences (Bourdieu 1977; 1990).  
Marginalized groups, like any other, have practical rationality and act to generate what they 
understand to be profit and social status, with the capitals available to them and within the areas of 
social life they feel such capitals will yield dividends. Such opportunities are by their nature limited, 
and whilst based on locally specific factors (e.g. particular configurations of poverty and racism), 
they have a tendency to share characteristics more broadly. In other words, exclusion from 
‘mainstream’ fields of socio-economic life play roles in the development of both street and jihadi 
fields. This does not make social and economic marginalization the sole explanation for radicalization 
or violent street culture (most living under similar conditions do not become either gangsters or 
jihadists), but it is within this context and responding to these structural conditions that 
radicalization in the west now appears to be increasingly occurring.  
Bourdieu’s framework offers a way of understanding the interplay of culture, ideology and socio-
economics in a manner that can explain both broader trends and individual careers in contemporary 
terrorism. This moves beyond existing strain theories of terrorism (Agnew, 2010) that operate at a 
macro geo-political level with ideology more central to explanations of motivation. We use 
Bourdieu’s theories and more particularly recent developments in Bourdieusian criminology to shed 
light on the move from the street violence, drug use and petty crime to international violent 
jihadism. We deliberately avoid debates about the numbers of individuals from street culture gone 
jihadist and of the ideological implications of faith and religion. Rather, our aim is to provide a 
framework that makes sense of how notable individuals seem to have radically altered their modes 
of being and to understand how they could move from relatively petty criminality to murderous 
violence with divergent ideological underpinnings, within a relatively short timeframe. 
Two case studies were selected for this purpose, each of which was high profile and definite, 
ensuring that sufficient publicly available information was available, and the facts reasonably 
uncontested. The paper relies on the availability of high quality, book-length journalistic treatments 
of the individuals at the centre of our case studies: Robert Verkaik (2016) chronicled Mohammed 
Emwazi’s life, journey to Syria and brutal violence. Erlend Ofte Arntsen (2016) similarly described the 
groups of friends in Fredrikstad, Norway that ended up as foreign fighters in Syria. Their stories 
confound simplistic radicalisation narratives, and indeed typical accounts of marginalised, ethnic 
minority youth.  
Street Capital 
Bourdieu (1984) describes how taste, practices and preferences can operate to create different 
hierarchies. Street capital builds on this idea and describes the competencies and skills that provide 
status in what is often described as street culture (see e.g. Bourgois 2003). The concept explains how 
individuals might deploy what they perceive of as their own advantageous traits in a subculture of 
crime, violence and street style when faced with social and/or economic exclusion. The concept 
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recognises that what is valued by particular groups can vary and is impacted by the operation of 
social structure (see similarly Jensen 2006). Decades of research has revealed how the street can be 
an arena for empowerment, status and alternative recognition (Ilan 2015). Below we explore how 
this has occurred in our case studies, constituting a first step in a journey from street culture to 
violent jihadism.    
A young man of middle-eastern ethnicity wears a stony face and fashionable flat-peaked, baseball 
cap. This is a photograph of Mohammed Emwazi, reputedly from his time as a university student 
that adorns multiple media stories reporting on his transition into ‘Jihadi John’. His story reveals a 
young man who once took solace in drug taking, street crime and rap music before finding 
international notoriety as a violent jihadi (Verkaik 2016). Emwazi was the child of a Bedoon family 
that had fled Kuwait to settle in the UK. Membership of this group meant that his family had been 
subject to various degrees of state and other persecution and thus his life began with an inherited 
experience of marginalisation. This must, however, be tempered by the fact that his family were able 
to find a secure existence in London, where Mohammed was able to be educated to university level. 
His experience is thus not typical of the inner-city poverty that is often associated with street 
culture. The specific factors that can constitute experiences of marginalization can vary however 
(Ilan 2015), and thus so too can motivations for an individual to become encultured into different 
varieties of street culture.  
Emwazi as a young teenager was small for his age and was frequently bullied. He was also coming to 
view himself as part of a faith persecuted and oppressed by the war on terror. At this point, his 
perceived marginalisation seemed to translate into a fascination with street culture: an admiration 
for the music and style of US rappers, a penchant for cannabis, alcohol, ‘hanging around’ and casual 
violence: ‘Emawazi had turned his back on his religion, detached himself from his Muslim upbringing 
and embraced a destructive teenage lifestyle’ (Verkaik 2016: 13). He is described as participating in 
‘gang’ activity and certainly could not be viewed as adhering to his faith. Instead, it is arguable that 
Emwazi took solace from and invested in a ‘gangsta’ persona both to refute a potentially ‘weak’ 
image and to challenge the mores of a culture that was seemingly heaping suspicion on young Asian 
men. In this context, dedication to the heady thrills of street life, the willingness to deploy violence 
at the slightest provocation and the cultivation of an appropriately tough and unpredictable persona 
can constitute the accumulation of street capital that could be deployed in a number of ways to 
advantage him amongst his peers.  
There are homologies in the case of Sammiulla Khan, Abo Edelbijev and Torleif Angel Sanchez 
Hammer, all born in 1991. Khan was the son of a Norwegian-Pakistani criminal drug abuser once 
convicted of murder. He was thus socialized into crime and substance use early. Failing at school, 
and limited by his family background from attempting various mainstream endeavours – he was 
nevertheless well placed to thrive within street culture. Edelbijev came to Norway from Chechnya 
with his family in 2002. He followed his father’s interest in weight lifting, and later got interested in 
Thai boxing and other martial arts. His war-zone background might have given him ‘street cred’, but 
it was his physical competencies and abilities to fight that gave him capital within a street field that 
venerates violent potential.  When asked by his parents why he travelled to Syria he explained that it 
was because he felt rejected and without prospects in Norway (Arntsen 2016: 226).  
Hammer was the son of a poorly integrated immigrant from the Philippines. He lost his Norwegian 
father early and got involved in extensive drug dealing and taking. He lacked the fighting skills of 
Edelbijev or the family background of Khan to draw on when entering the street world. For a time 
drug dealing and being able to use his mother’s apartment as a place to hang out gave him a certain 
position among friends in Fredrikstad. With time, a conversion first to Islam and then engagement in 
7 
 
violent jihadism gave him the sense of belonging he seems to have missed his entire life (Arntsen 
2016).  
While having very different backgrounds and interests the three became good friends and spent 
their adolescence hanging out together. In the beginning they shared interest in girls, partying and 
internet conspiracy theories. Each of them possessed traits that initially could provide them with 
advantages within the street field. What have been described as ‘angry young men’ (Sageman, 2007) 
and/or ‘misfits’ (Nesser, 2015) can perceive there to be a lot on offer from participation in jihadi 
groups:  
‘Just like the criminal gangs of which they used to be members, jihadist groups offered 
power, violence, adventure and adrenaline, a strong identity, and – not least – a sense of 
rebellion and being anti-establishment’ (Basra, Neumann and Brunner, 2016: 24).    
Both UK and Norwegian case studies demonstrate the extent to which these street turned politico-
religious criminals developed traits that were responses to their particular experiences of 
marginalisation. The cultivation of these traits requires ‘investment’ – both practical and psychic. In 
street culture it is not enough that violence be embodied and signified through demeanour and 
attitude (although this is important) – the capabilities to effectively dispense the violence are 
necessary too. Similarly, the daring to commit the criminal act is not sufficient, criminal 
competencies are important. Young men possessed of these traits are not simply advantaged as 
street criminals but possess embodied capacities of high value to jihadi groups. For the young men 
themselves, this means that their investments are not wasted, but transferred into a different arena 
where they retain value.  
As Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016: 35) note, these are young men with practised abilities and 
competencies that are not necessarily easy to cultivate in a short space of time: evading the gaze of 
law enforcement, access to weapons and the lived/embodied experience of violence (something 
very different to the appreciation of it as a tool in the abstract). Finally, that an aspect of street 
capital is the ability to look appropriately tough as well as on trend in terms of streetwear fashion, 
vests those with a stock of it with additional appeal to jihadist recruiters – such individuals can 
actively attract a wider cohort of young people which might make additional recruitment easier yet.  
Street social capital 
The recruitment of street-competent individuals does not take place in a vacuum but draws on, and 
can occur through, organically existing networks of friendship and acquaintance within the street 
field. These are not simply part of a landscape of sociability but are themselves a source of ‘capital’ 
for those to whom they bestow benefits. Bourdieu defines social capital as ‘the aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition’ (Bourdieu 1986: 248). In the 
context of marginalised young men involved in street culture, this can comprise of other tough 
young men who can be called upon to boost numbers in the case of conflicts, or banks of contacts 
who can facilitate access to criminal markets (Ilan, 2013). Street friendship dynamics and the 
advantages bestowed by street networks facilitate the transition from street culture to violent 
jihadism.  
Both street and jihadist groups offer solidarity and a sense of brotherhood, sometimes occupying 
affective spaces that might otherwise fill with despair. Emwazi’s eventual recruitment into ISIS was 
the ultimate outcome of his relationship with men, some years older than him, who had become 
involved in overseas politico-religious violence. His local scene is described as having evolved from a 
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more typical street ‘gang’ into an ideologically orientated grouping that could self-finance through 
robbery and send members abroad to fight (Verkaik 2016). Emwazi identified with the street 
mythologies of leading members of that set, and was impressed by photographs of them wielding 
weapons while fighting in Somalia and their tales of derring-do evading the security services in 
Britain. In such a way: ‘jihad [was given] a “gangsta” context which made it feel both exciting and 
worthwhile’ (Verkaik 2016: 34). Emwazi was thus not just presented with the opportunity to join a 
movement that resonated with his existing orientation, but to mix in the company of men he 
admired – that were both of the street and transcendent of it.  
Arntsen’s (2016) account of the Norwegian case, also shows how street networks are important for 
recruitment. In the months leading up to the departure of Khan and Edelbijev to Syria in September 
2013, the three friends discussed tactics. Khan was the most eager to travel while Edelbijev and 
especially Hammer seemed more hesitant. Hammer argued that they could do good in Norway 
collecting money for, and promoting the cause. Edelbijev was persuaded that he did not need 
parental permission to fight by a fatwa forwarded to him by Khan, convincing him that his 
obligations to God were more important than those to family (Arntsen 2016: 208). Hammer, 
however, remained in Norway and was forced to endure both unemployment and the absence of his 
close friends. They kept in regular contact via the internet.  
Hammer’s exposure to Islam was through his friendship group not his family. The participation of 
Khan and Edelbijev in violent jihad, and their travels to Syria impressed on him the extent to which 
he was left out, and arguably created a strong impetus for him to follow them over. Whether he was 
as committed to the ideology or the adventure is an open question but in total seven people from 
the same street in Fredrikstad became foreign fighters in Syria (Arntsen 2016). Those who went first 
constantly encouraged friends at home to join them and assisted in practical arrangements. For 
some, travelling to Syria was a way to catch up and share experiences with their good friends. Street 
culture tends to ask its adherents to show ultimate loyalty to their peer group, and there is cause to 
conclude that the individuals who travelled saw themselves as being able to participate in an 
opportunity opened up through their friendships.  
Nesser (2015) shows how well-established networks of jihadists are crucial to understanding 
radicalization and the enactment of terrorist plots. In the Emwazi case, he was guided toward violent 
jihad by the older men he had befriended who themselves were connected to overseas 
organisations. The same can be said of the Fredrikstad trio who developed friendship links with 
those who in turn had their connections abroad. For Nesser (2015) such networks are particularly 
adept at catching ‘drifters’, the most populous of the recruit-typology groups he identifies. 
Friendship groups become the spaces in which violence can be valorised and ideologies praised. 
They serve thus to hold and indeed bolster the commitment of group members seeming to waiver. 
For individuals to constitute a source of street capital for their friends, they must demonstrate 
willingness to be appropriately violent – a trait that serves the interests of jihadi groups. The desire 
not just to avail of opportunities made available through friendship but to be a useful contact (in 
turn generating street capital through building a reputation) sustains systems of street social capital 
(Ilan 2013). This has clear echoes in the group processes of jihadi recruitment.  
Street Habitus  
For Bourdieu habitus is a ‘system of durable, transposable dispositions’ that orientates individuals 
towards practice (Bourdieu 1990: 53). A street habitus thus constitutes a range of bodily postures, 
modes of speech, ways of interpreting the world and patterns of ‘instinctive’ behaviours that both 
mark people as marginalised and make crime and violence seem like appropriate reactions to 
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particular situations (Fraser 2013; 2015). Since the habitus is the product of accrued experience and 
operates at a pre-conscious level, the ways of being and modes of behaviour it facilitates are difficult 
to consciously ‘perform’ (or ‘put on’).  
Of course, individuals tend to operate across different fields (Bourdieu 2005) and a street habitus 
should not be understood as ordering every aspect of an individual’s life towards an absolutely 
street orientation. There are degrees, contexts and of course notions of agency that are important. 
The concept does, however, deftly describe some of the currents operating below the level of 
conscious agency. The embodiment of violent potential and ability to readily deploy violence are 
often components of the street habitus (Ilan, 2015) and can thus constitute a key resource within 
contexts that operate outside of the operation of legal regulation. Where a violent habitus must thus 
be ‘grown’ as opposed to ‘selected’, it becomes clear that street cultural individuals offer an 
attractive proposition to jihadi recruiters as individuals whose dispositions can be put to work 
immediately (see Basra, Neumann and Brunner, 2016).  
Usefully, the concept of street habitus allows for an understanding of the particular nature of the 
conversion to Islam that has been noted in the context of the latest wave of recruits.  Cottee (2016a) 
describes this as: ‘a sort of radicalization lite, where self-identity, not behavior, becomes the 
relevant transformational measure’. Crone (2016) emphasizes how recent processes of radicalization 
are fundamentally embodied, pointing out how recent jihadists seems to be acquainted with 
violence before entering into politico-religious radicalization. Indeed, such accounts point to an 
uptake of a jihadi narrative on top of more durable dispositions and patterns of behaviour more 
commonly associated with criminality and street culture. Recruits are able to retain many of their 
existing ways of being within a new context of politico-religious violence where these produce a 
further asset to recruiters: ‘street cool’, a potent set of symbols that can be used to boost the 
popularity of ‘brands’ to a youth market (see Ilan, 2015). 
The links between the overrun of street habitus into the world of jihadi violence are evidenced by 
Verkaik’s (2016) accounts of those within the wider network in which Emwazi was embedded. They 
were arrested for being drunk and disorderly on their flight to Tanzania from which they were due to 
continue to a life of sober combat on behalf of al-Shaabab (Verkaik 2016: 71). Similarly, some of the 
young men who participated in the 2016 terror attacks in Paris and Nice had persisted with deeply 
hedonistic ‘party’ lifestyles (a noted facet of street culture) until close to their infamous acts of 
violence (Cottee, 2016a, 2016b). Upon arrival in Syria, street cultural tropes around the reverence of 
consumer culture and luxury, casual violence and the projection of a sense of mastery and control 
could continue and indeed flourish.  
Much like Emwazi and his network the three Fredrikstad fighters were noted for a fondness of 
marijuana, gaming and the adoption of street fashion and slang. They too began to intersperse this 
mode of speech with Arabic as their interests in Islam and jihad grew. For the Fredrikstad network, 
their earlier experiences of conflict and violence over time can be understood to have sedimented 
into a street habitus. The prospect of transposing this way of being into the context of the war in 
Syria offered the exciting possibility of affirming their street masculinities within a context that 
seemed heroic. The Fredrikstad friends a number of scams to secure the funds to travel to Syria, 
breaching several Islamic rules. They maxed out credit cards, obtained cheap mobile phones by 
signing up for long contracts, and even secured a student loan before absconding from their debts to 
Syria. They justified this by reasoning that their victims were not Muslim and that their actions were 
beneficial to their cause (Artnsen, 2016: 212). Meanwhile Verkaik (2016) describes how young men 
from Emwazi’s wider network had undertaken similar practices with similar justifications. Arguably 
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their familiarity and comfort with breaking the law and social convention to obtain what they deem 
important stemmed from their street habitus, but could serve a new agenda.  
Religious conversion has been theorised as a transformative process that encapsulates a pedagogic 
imprint on the habitus (Shilling and Mellor 2010). As such, the persistence of a pre-conversion 
habitus into a new religious identity merits examination. A striking component of the Norwegian’s 
conversion was the sincerity and religious devotion they suddenly seemed to exhibit. The change 
was most dramatic for Hammer who lacked Muslim family. At first, he claimed that conversion 
changed his behaviour, texting a friend: ‘I used to be the worst criminal, not long ago, until I found 
the light’ (Arntsen 2016: 129). Habitus, however, often has the connotation of inertia, whereby early 
experiences and socialisation tend to influence life trajectories (Bourdieu, 1990: 54). The stated 
desire to behave differently butts up against years of patterned orientations. Leaving their street 
lives behind was difficult for the three friends.  
Although they seemed to try hard, their embodied habitus seemed to draw them back towards the 
street. Hammer sometimes drank and partied heavily whilst other times he refused to celebrate his 
birthday stating that it would go against his new Muslim beliefs (Arntsen 2016: 227). This ongoing 
struggle between their different cultural influences can be seen in the messages they sent each 
other. Before going to Syria, Edelbijev wrote to Khan: ‘If there is a khalifa (caliphate) I hope I go. 
“Fuck” this illusion of a world brother’ (Arntsen 2016: 205), combining religious references (brother, 
caliphate), references to Internet-based conspiracy theories (‘illusion’) and the street (‘fuck’ in 
English) in two short sentences. Khan replied that he did not want to die in a hospital and instead 
wanted a proud death, reflecting how the machismo of street culture can dovetail with jihadi ideas.  
Khan continuously shared photographs of himself posing with weapons ‘gangsta-style’ on social 
media – seemingly performing identity work that bridges his former identity with his new aspirations 
of becoming a jihadist warrior. Drawing on Bauman (2000) Cottee (2016a) notes, that the gangsta-
jihadi persona is the product of flows between the two identities. The street habitus is transposed, 
not transformed. Emwazi was said to have become increasingly cold, vicious and violent in the war-
zone context (Verbaik 2016). Here, the field of politico-religious war served to allow him to present 
the traits of exaggerated cruelty that the street tends to more rhetorically celebrate than practically 
deploy. Whilst the accounts of the Norwegian friends suggest that they did not revel in sadism to the 
same extent, they variously fought with heavy or specialist weaponry, whilst showing support for 
decapitation.  
Street habitus is tightly linked to street capital in explaining why individuals with a background in 
‘ordinary’ crime, violence and drug use become jihadists, the inertia of habitus can also help explain 
why they do not change more once joined. It seems newly radicalized individuals from street culture 
retain much of their old street style, and old street practices while committed to a politico-religious 
violence. Indeed the kinds of ‘jihadi cool’ noted by Cottee (2015) arguably draw on these tropes and 
allow groups like ISIS to circulate messages and images that draw simultaneously on piety and street 
culture. Fraser’s (2015) notion of ‘homologies of habitus’ notes the similarities in what is valued 
amongst tough, masculinist cultures of marginalisation across different global contexts. The 
language of the street field (Sandberg and Fleetwood 2016) fuses with that of international jihadism, 
emphasizing the gloriousness of violence and death, fatalism, Arabic expressions and machismo. The 
new life in Syria could deliver what their street habitus guided them to seek: a close fellowship of 
young men engaged in exciting and daring activities.   
Street Field 
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Bourdieu (1993) defined ‘field’ as the arena in which individuals struggle for position. Fields embody 
the logic and rules that give capitals their value (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and they both house 
and continuously shape the habitus (see Swartz 1997; Hanks 2005). Every individual exists within 
multiple fields (e.g. the fields of education, employment, religious devotion, consumerism etc.). 
Fields, moreover, are positioned in relation to each other with the field of power (politics) imposing 
a master order. Those who feel that they cannot thrive within mainstream fields may instead invest 
themselves in struggles in ‘heterodox’ fields – those that run contrary to the grain of the field of 
power. Shammas and Sandberg (2016) developed the notion of the street field within which deviant 
acts and embodying street culture enable individuals to gain stature. Importantly, they argue that 
state action (in particular the creation and enforcement of the law) delineates the street field by 
causing individuals to feel that their interests would be best served by investments outside of 
mainstream life. Socio-economic marginalization can operate in a similar manner.  
 
In the UK case, Verkaik (2016) reports that experiences of xenophobia and negative interactions with 
the security services served to cement young men first into street and later jihadi fields. The 
journalist shared the story of a group from North London (at least one of which was linked to 
Emwazi’s network) – who first had to learn to fight simply to secure a place on the street, but then 
faced post-9/11 a more confusing state of affairs where, despite their British street accents, they 
were forced to somehow prove their loyalty and authenticity. They reported manipulation and 
intimidation tactics on the part of the British security services who would bombard them with 
accusations and threats. They faced travel bans, perceived harassment and had their families drawn 
into these desperately uncomfortable ordeals: ‘it was hardly any wonder that they found it easier to 
simply disengage from mainstream society…’ (Verkaik 2016: 67). The consequence of intense and 
visceral feelings of exclusion – whether imposed by racist bullies in the park or overbearing security 
officers serve to convince the targets that they have no chance within mainstream fields and that if 
they are to invest their energies to advance, this would only be a reasonable possibility within 
‘outlaw’, heterodox fields.  
In the Norwegian case experiences of security forces and xenophobia seemed to be less important. 
Rather, their increasing religious commitment seemed born of a genuine awakening and a sense of 
having ‘grown out’ or gotten tired of street life. Nevertheless, their experiences of more typical 
socio-economic marginalization would seem to have viscerally impressed on them their distance 
from the mainstream fields of education and employment and they felt that they would need to 
cultivate a sense of belonging elsewhere.  
These cases serve to illustrate the resonances between heterodox fields that can appear very 
different: the materialist and hedonistic street and religious, ascetic politico-religious combat. That 
similar traits and characteristics can serve individuals well within both, however, indicates the extent 
to which they have running against the grain of mainstream life in common. The move from the 
street to jihad is not so improbable when viewed through this lens. Indeed, jihad is open to be 
perceived by street cultural adherents as a more ‘mature’ and ‘fulfilling’ field of struggle in which to 
invest energy. Evidently also, many Western jihadists have experienced state violence as a 
consequence of engagement in both ‘ordinary’ crime and jihadist milieus, and state responses to 
both fields have served to more forcefully delineate and funnel individuals into them (Crone 2016; 
Walklate and Mythen 2016). Both dressing in street style and sporting the styles of religious Islamic 
devotion can attract the attention of the authorities – although both styles are also adopted by the 
law-abiding. There is a racial element to these visual practices of exclusion, moreover, where it is 
ethnic minorities that tend to be targeted in the campaigns against both fields. The resonances 
between the fields are strengthened by the criminalization of a wide variety of acts as precursors to, 
or supportive of terrorism – whereby those who are politico-religious can be subject to a 
criminalizing gaze in a manner previously more associated with street populations.  
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The resonances between the street and politico-religious fields furthermore accounts for the hybrid 
styles and practices earlier noted, where some of those fighting for groups such as ISIS engage in a 
range of behaviours prohibited by Islam: consuming intoxicants and participating in secular, street 
violence. It also explains the kinds of ‘jihadi cool’ noted earlier including styles of rap music (though 
music is forbidden in strict Salafism) and videos and video games that have more visually in common 
with western action genres than Islamic culture (Barbara 2015). Sartorial features are shared 
between the two fields, where kufiyahs, camouflage, beards, baggy trousers, sunglasses, all - terrain 
vehicles, automatic weapons, baseball caps, US gang-style poses and t-shirts become part of a visual 
grammar common to groups across both.  
Conclusion 
In a research field dominated by political science and religious studies, Bourdieusian criminology 
offers a distinct understanding of the processes that occur when criminology’s ‘usual suspects’ (drug 
users and street criminals) turn political or religious extremist . In this paper, we have shown how 
this perspective allows for an understanding of what occurs in recent shifts from street culture to 
politico-religious criminality: between a ‘gangster’ and violent jihadist identity. The connections 
between ‘conventional’ street criminality and extremist political violence are of course not restricted 
to jihadism. Particular Northern Irish paramilitaries have been involved in practices that are more 
typical of criminal gangs (Guardian, 2003). More recently, a number of scholars have noted that 
certain politically violent organisations might be better categorised as street gang in nature (Pyrooz 
and Densley 2018; Valasik and Reid 2018; Reid and Valasik 2018). There is arguably however, a 
particular significance with jihadism given that IS has strategically reached out to those who may 
hold more of a street criminal identity (Andersen and Sandberg, 2018). In contemporary public and 
academic debates characterized by a false dichotomy between marginalization and politico-religious 
explanations of jihadi-violence, Bourdieu’s work (e.g. 1977; 1990) offers a valuable theoretical 
synthesis. Capital, habitus and field are concepts that emphasize the interplay between ideology, 
socio-economic processes, social networks and the state. They can thus assist an understanding of 
the ‘ambiguous and messy situations’ that constitute contemporary western extremism (Walklate 
and Mythen 2016: 11).  
Bourdieu’s (1990) emphasis on practical rationality problematizes simplistic notions of radicalisation 
and the desire for self-sacrifice (Roy 2017). Individuals with street capital can ‘reinvest’ their 
competencies and skills in violent-jihadi milieu, where their embodied characteristics and 
orientations advantage them. In this way such individuals are not merely ‘redeemed’ through jihad 
but elevated in status amongst new and old peers, the importance of peer groups and networks 
retaining their value in the transition. Bourdieusian criminology furthermore allows for an 
understanding of the distinction made between behavioral and cognitive radicalization (see Vidino 
and Brandon 2012). The street habitus can be viewed as a ‘pre-existing’ habituation into practices of 
violence and threat – the cognitive justification of religious goals need only be overlaid onto it. In 
this way, it is furthermore less difficult to understand how the seemingly disparate fields of street 
culture and politico-religious struggle can share style and symbolism as well as soldiers and 
temperaments. Of course, stark contradictions exist between the secular, materialist and hedonistic 
worlds of street culture and the spiritually orientated, restrictive dictates of the violent jihadi 
ideologies. Our argument is that embodied characteristics and logics from the street field play a 
significant role in processes of contemporary radicalization in Europe.  
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